Risk Benchmarking for Onshore and Offshore LNG Developments by Raghunathan, Vijay et al.
         
 
Risk Benchmarking for Onshore and Offshore LNG Developments 
 
Vijay Raghunathan and Robin Pitbaldo 
DNV-GL Group. 
vijay.raghunathan@dnvgl.com, robin.pitblado@dnvgl.com  
Mukudray Dave 




With the continuing growth in the global LNG trade and an increased activity of liquefaction 
projects proposed within North America, safety risk management is gaining more focus both 
from regulators and public. Multiple Stakeholders, new technologies, tighter deadlines, cost 
efficiency and an increased focus on safety are some of the key factors driving these projects. As 
the industry is moving towards adopting principles of inherent safety, earlier in the projects, 
complex design decisions are being made with relatively less design data or input. This poses an 
endless challenge to both the project management making investment decisions and the design 
team making design decisions. Hence, the aim of this paper is to draw examples from previous 
LNG projects worldwide and provide best practice guidance on risk assessment processes. 
The first part of the paper will focus on differences in regional regulatory requirements within 
North America and an understanding of the risk criteria being used. The uncertainties to be 
considered in an LNG QRA are covered in this section, which forms the key to early design 
decisions. The second part of the paper will summarize the qualitative risk results and discuss the 
top risk contributors from LNG projects including the band of individual risk observed.. Since 
likelihood of failure events usually plays a major role in the evaluation of risks, it is important to 
align these with the risk criteria used to ensure risk reduction decisions (ALARP decisions) are 
effectively made in the right order of priority i.e. focus on the top events first. Overall, this paper 
will serve as a risk benchmarking tool for both onshore and offshore LNG (FLNG) developments 
in arriving at key decisions earlier in the design.  
Introduction 
The significant changes in the oil industry over the past year have indeed affected the gas 
industry dynamics. LNG projects approved several years ago in a more robust pricing 
environment are now coming on stream. The supply abundance has affected gas hub and spot 
LNG pricing levels. LNG contract prices are trending downward, driven by traditional oil-linked 
formulas (IGU, 2016). Most projects under construction remain active toward planned schedules 
as the engineering, construction, and procurement contractors have committed to construction 
schedules and could incur a penalty if they are late.  
Similarly, many projects that have already made arrangements for their upstream feedstock 
would incur penalties if production is not received. While these commitments remain, the LNG 
stakeholders are constantly working to balance the risks vs price challenge. Extended 
commissioning and start-up periods, reduced performance, logistical challenges, cost overruns 
and other problems can all significantly affect a project’s economics. The risks are significant 
and the underlying causes span political circumstances and unclear interfaces, to technology that 
does not deliver. LNG projects are large and complex, with advanced technology, and de-risking 
the project at evert stage of development has never been more critical. This paper aims at 
highlighting the experience gained previous LNG liquefaction developments to manage and 
mitigate risks for future projects at an early stage.  
North America LNG Risk Management Regulations 
Currently there are no enforced regulations that require the use of risk assessments for assessing 
safety hazards of new onshore or offshore LNG developments.  Within the U.S. regulatory 
scheme, responsibilities for regulating safety of onshore LNG facilities with respect to potential 
releases of LNG and offsite hazards is shared according to jurisdictional requirements of two 
principal Federal agencies, the U.S. Federal Regulatory Commission (FERC) for siting and 
certification of onshore facilities serving LNG marine terminal activities and the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT) for other large onshore facilities,  Facilities outside the 
Federal jurisdiction, most simply characterized as facilities not part of the interstate natural gas 
system in the U.S. are covered by state and local requirements, which often refer to 49 CFR 193 
requirements for offsite hazards as well as to NFPA 59A .The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is 
responsible for assuring the safety of marine operations in U.S. coastal waters under provisions 
of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act and also the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
(MTSA). The USCG also regulates the design, construction, and operation of LNG ships and the 
duties of LNG ship officers and crews (Ted A. Williams). 
There are more than 110 LNG facilities operating in the U.S. performing a variety of services. 
Some facilities export natural gas from the U.S., some provide natural gas supply to the interstate 
pipeline system or local distribution companies, while others are used to store natural gas for 
periods of peak demand. Depending on location and use, an LNG facility may be regulated by 
several federal agencies and by state utility regulatory agencies (FERC). 
 
The FERC is responsible for authorizing the siting and construction of onshore and near-shore 
LNG import or export facilities under Section 3 of the Natural Gas. FERC requirements include 
detailed site engineering and design information, evidence that an LNG facility will safely 
receive or deliver LNG, and delineation of a facility’s proposed location and geologic risk, if 
any.  
Risk Based vs Consequence Based  
  
Tolerability of consequences and risk is a contentious issue, but it has been addressed in many 
countries by various means.  The following section describes the differences between a 
consequence-based and a risk based approach and its application. 
Consequence Basis  
Consequences are normally developed in one of two formats and there are sensible arguments for 
each 
 Maximum Credible Event 
 Worst Case Event 
 
Maximum Credible Events (MCE) do not have a precise definition, but they are the maximum 
size event that is believed credible for the facilities in some realistic timeframe, say 2 to 5 plant 
lifetimes.  It is larger than would be expected in the single lifetime of the facility under 
discussion.  There is judgment involved in defining the MCE. 
Worst Case Events also do not have a precise definition, but it is often easier to define a worst 
case compared to an MCE. The worst case would also give very large consequence zones, both 
from the operating facilities and from the shipping activities. 
The simplest approach to establish tolerability is to calculate potential consequences and if the 
siting is sufficiently remote or population exposure small, then a site can be regarded as 
tolerable.   
Siting criteria for LNG Facilities in the U.S. are established on a consequence basis in both 
NFPA 59A and in U.S. federal regulations 49 CFR 193.  U.S. siting requirements appear 
stringent as these are based on a 10 minute worst case release from the largest pipe under full 
flow conditions.  This will usually be the export pipeline from the LNG storage tank.  Such a 
spill must be contained in a suitable impoundment nearby, and the vapour dispersion from the 
impoundment must not extend beyond the fence line at a concentration of ½ LFL for specified 
weather conditions. This is to define the downwind flammable envelope which might impact 
anyone caught within the cloud if it were ignited – termed a flash fire.  Normally there are no 
safety impacts beyond the actual flash fire limit.  Strictly the flammable limit is the LFL – Lower 
Flammable Limit, but it is generally acknowledged that there are uncertainties in prediction of 
the flammable distance, and the best models are generally only accurate within a factor of 2 
either way (over or under estimate), hence ½ LFL is used to be conservative.  There are also 
separate thermal criteria, but these are rarely the deciding separation distance.   
The approach also  requires that a formal validation exercise meeting PHMSA (Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration) specifications.  This must be submitted to PHMSA 
for approval.  Currently, only 3 models have been approved by this process – DNV GL Phast, 
Gexcon FLACS, and the public domain DEGADIS.  The validation is described by Witlox (3).  
Risk Basis 
Given the divergence in approaches for consequences and the very large distances possible with 
worst case events, many countries and developers now prefer to use a risk-based approach.  The 
general method is described in the U.S. CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety) Guideline 
for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Assessment (4).  The advantage of the risk approach is 
that it focuses not on the worst case event, but instead the accumulation of the whole range of 
events from minor to worst case, but linking each event with its likelihood of occurrence.  Thus 
catastrophic but very rare events are considered, but due to their low frequency the actual risk 
may be dominated by medium scale events which happen more frequently.  Generally people 
plan their own lives using a mental model of the risk involved, not the possible worst case 
consequences – think of driving a car or riding in an elevator.  If we based our decision on worst 
case – which would be death, we would never do either.  Instead, we rely on good design and 
manufacturing practices, industry standards, and an effective regulatory regime to ensure that 
sufficient safeguards are in place that the risk of the activity is very small. 
Major hazard process facilities are the same.  We rely on good design and manufacture, that 
suitable codes are used throughout, and that the regulatory regime ensures all necessary 
safeguards are in place. 
There are two main means to estimate risk quantitatively, either by Location Specific Individual 
Risk (LSIR) or by Societal Risk.  
Individual Risk is normally calculated by defining all risk events – usually loss of containment 
events and for a large facility there can be hundreds of these.  Each event is calculated for its 
possible consequences – dispersion, fire, explosion taking account of the possible wind direction 
and atmospheric stability, and all the various ignition sources.  The event likelihood is estimated, 
usually from historical records of past leak events and then all the outcomes are summed to 
generate the risk at all locations around the facility.  This is shown graphically as iso-risk 
contours (called LSIR contours) – similar to elevation contours on a map.  The inner contour is 
the highest risk (often 1E-03 or 1E-04 per year) and normally contours are plotted in declining 
order of magnitude circles until some very low level of risk is predicted, often 1E-06 or 1E-07 
per year. Generally, Individual Risk requires detailed calculations, beyond the scope of a High 
Level Assessment. 
Societal risk is more complex and it is plotted as a so-called F-N graph – a log-log plot of 
Frequency of occurrence vs. the Number of people affected.  It requires detailed calculations 
linking people affected by their location to all the events and this cannot be done for a High 
Level Risk Assessment.  Other facility results only apply to the population distribution around 
those sites and that is always different for a new site.   
Societal risk is most appropriate where there are large numbers of people potentially affected; 
that is not the case here and thus Individual Risk is more appropriate for this evaluation. 
Risk Benchmarking 
 
Risk benchmarking is an exercise to compile the common hazards that are key to designing a 
safe facility and this section of the document will split this into two parts. Part 1 will highlight 
the hazards, their qualitative risk impact that can be used for understanding the LNG hazards 
both onshore and offshore and de-risk the project at an early stage. The second part presents 
anonymized individual risk results from some LNG sites around the world to benchmark any 
new design either before or after a preliminary risk assessment. 
 
Qualitative Benchmarking  
For any onshore or offshore LNG development, an early HAZID is an important step in 
identifying the major accident hazards and the risk impact. The following table presents some of 
the key hazards, their associated risk impact and the safeguards that could be considered at an 
early stage of the project. 
 
Typical Onshore and Offshore (FLNG) Hazards and Safeguards 




 A very long topside layout can have 
the design and technology limits 
stretched 
 Structural Load assessment could be 
a challenge while trying to design for 
complex combination of loads 
imposed by motion of tides 
 If the vessel is high sided it could be 
subject to wind loads (high windage) 
Onshore:  N/A 
 Technology 
qualification or 
Approval in Principle at 
an early stage could 
help identify issues 
early 
 Usual safeguard for 
FLNG is to 
weathervane and 
present bow to wind 
load, in this option that 
is not possible with 
fixed mooring 
Safety Gaps Offshore 
 There is a need for safety gaps 
between modules to mitigate 
potential vapour cloud explosion 
(VCE) risk. An increased safety gap 
could cost significant amounts due to 
increased vessel dimension 
requirements, hence a balance is 
required. 
 There are no widely-accepted criteria 
in the industry on optimum safety 
gaps for FLNG; however DNV GL 
from its previous experience has seen 
7-15 m gaps between congested 
modules. Currently a joint industry 
research project is being led by 
 A layout review and a 
design QRA to evaluate 
the effect of safety gaps 
Hazard Risk Impact Safeguard 
Gexcon with DNV GL participating 
by running the large scale 
experiments at our Spadeadam test 
site. 
Onshore:  
 Safety Gaps may not be usually an 
issue in case of onshore 
developments given the availability 
of space, however combining of 
adjacent congested units should still 
be minimised to reduce VCE risk. 
Manning / 
Control Centre  
Offshore 
 Manning offshore could be more of a 
challenge due to space constraints.  
 Other than the impact to manning at 
the main control center, the control 
center is safety critical and losing its 
functionality onboard an FLNG due 
to fire or explosion could lead to 
severe escalation. 
Onshore 
 The impact to control center is 
equally critical like an offshore set 
up but due to less space constraints 
can be managed better. 
 
 A design QRA to 
evaluate personnel risk 
 Careful review of 
manning needs and 
location for control 
center  
Flare Offshore and Onshore 
 Height and orientation need to be 
considered carefully to make sure it 
doesn’t distract any offsite activity or 
impact onsite workers.  Also the flare 
is an active ignition source, hence 
location is critical. 
 A flare close to the airport flight path 
may cause distraction for pilots. 
 The height of the flare 
must assure low thermal 
radiation onto nearby 
elevated process 
equipment and avoid 
ignition of flammable 
clouds. 
 If close to high hazard 
modules, the flare 
structure has to be 
designed to survive any 
immediate explosion 
effects and serve its 
Hazard Risk Impact Safeguard 
function (e.g. 
blowdown is critical). 
Single Train 
Option 
Offshore and Onshore 
 Losing any part of a single 
liquefaction and fractionation units, 
may result in shut down causing 
more operational pressure on 
operators/maintenance to keep units 
running. 
 
 Design and reliability 
review for more 
inherent safe options 
 QRA to assess impact 




Offshore and Onshore 
 There are potential detonation 
hazards if ethylene or any double 
bonded chemical is used part of the 
refrigeration cycle. 
 Unlike deflagration, detonation 
involves the entire mass of the 
flammable cloud and not just the 
cloud congested volume and hence 
produces higher overpressure. 
 Evaluating potential for 
an inherent safe design 
substituting ethylene 






 Spills can cause cryogenic damage 
especially to the deck and hull, could 
impair the trestle as an escape way, 
and also affect access to lifeboats if 
they are downwind 
 Large cryogenic spill overboard 
could allow flammable gases to blow 
back onto the vessel. 
Onshore 
Cryogenic Spills might be easier to 
handle onshore due to less space 
constraints but there is a still a risk of 
both localised personnel and equipment 
damage. 
 Cryogenic Spill 
Philosophy 
 Safeguard could be 
deck drainage and 
collecting spills using 
an insulated channel 
and diverting to an 
impoundment on the 
trestle. 
Hazard Risk Impact Safeguard 
Storage Offshore 
 LNG storage could be Prismatic 
Type B or membrane, Spherical 
tanks are not practical 
 If condensate and/or LPG is stored 
onboard (may be in the hull), then 
additional cargo vessels will be 
visiting as well contributing to higher 
unloading risk. 
 Pressurized refrigerant storage and 
LPG on-board could pose additional 
hydrocarbon risk (BLEVE). 
Onshore 
Storage tank options are similar but the 
spills can be contained much easier and 
isolated from other units. 
 Double-walled hull will 
protect against tank 
impacts from collision. 
 Cryogenic spill 
philosophy to divert 
spills quickly away 
from the process deck 
will minimize structural 
damage to hull deck and 
tanks below. 
 For inherent safety on 
FLNG, store refrigerant 
at safe location onshore 
and transfer from an 
ISO-container as needed 
to the FLNG barge 
(transfer of refrigerant 
would be required in 
any case if the 






 Very large congested vessel could 
pose a situational awareness 
problem, no visual clues about 
potential leak/incident on one end of 
the barge for personnel working on 
other end. 
 If Trestle connections are used to 
escape from the vessel onshore, they 
could be prone to structural damage 
from fire or explosion. 
Onshore 
 Escape and Evacuation route impact 
can be much less severe in an 
onshore arrangement due to less 
space constraint. 
 Safety of escapeways 
for the full range of 
events needs to be part 
of the layout QRA. 
 Lifeboats may be 
necessary for potential 
evacuation for 
personnel located at 
each end of the vessel 
due to large flammable 
events preventing 
access to trestle and 
hence land. 
 Means to enhance 
situational awareness 
for staff at locations 
remote from escape 
needs to be considered 
(e.g. strobe Alarms). 
 Trestle escapeway 
structural design to 
withstand potential fire 
Hazard Risk Impact Safeguard 
and blast accidental 
loads and ability to 
shelter staff 
 Multiple connection 
points between trestle 
and FLNG providing 





 Potential extra congestion source to 
any potential drifting vapour cloud 
posing higher explosion risk due to 
gas collecting between the vessels 
Onshore : Not applicable 
 
 Deck drainage and 
collecting spills using 
an insulated channel 
and diverting to an 
impoundment on the 
trestle (opposite side of 
carrier position) 
 Shutdown of electrical 
sources upon flammable 
gas detection  
Trestle vehicle 
movement 
Offshore and Onshore 
 This could pose an additional 
ignition source given that there could 
be significant vehicle movement to 
move personnel and heavy 
equipment.   
 Active control of the 
number of vehicle trips 
especially during 
loading could help 





 Weathervaning is a standard safety 
measure for offshore FLNG 
facilities; however an onshore FLNG 
is moored and cannot weathervane. 
 Safeguards would be to 
locate any 
accommodation / 
control room module 
upstream of the 
predominant wind 
direction to reduce the 
potential impact of 
drifting vapour clouds. 








Offshore  Design review to 
optimise piping runs  
Hazard Risk Impact Safeguard 
 Increased piping runs and hence 
increase congestion and could create 
more potential leak points. 
 Insufficient separation between 
process and accommodation modules 
Onshore 
 The same hazard applies but less of 
an issue due to more space available. 
 A design QRA to 
evaluate separation gaps 
SIMOPS Offshore 
 If the FLNG is producing and 
offloading at the same time, this 
could impose structural stresses on 
the vessel with improper tank 
fill/export procedures. Example of 
such a vessel structural failure was 
the Betelgeuse incident in 1979 in 
Ireland.  
Onshore 
 In this case SIMOPS may be more of 
constructing multiple trains while 
one is producing. 
 Management of loading 
operations including 
offloading of the LNG 
carrier could help 
mitigate the risk. 
 Classification structural 
review with extra 
strengthening to 
mitigate any cargo 
handling error 
 Better ignition source 
control during SIMOPS 
 A design QRA to 
understand the 
increased risk profile 





Crane location to lift heavy equipment 
with respect to jetty location could be a 
dropped object hazard 
 
 Material handling study 
will address this 
scenario and a 
subsequent dropped 
object study could help 
identify hazards of 
dropping and damaging 




 Interaction with fishing vessels, other 
recreational crafts; navigational 
equipment on those vessels might not 
 Marine Traffic study 
and Collision Risk 
Assessment to better 
mitigate collision risks 
(TERMPOL study) 
Hazard Risk Impact Safeguard 
be that sophisticated as other passing 
heavy vessels 
Onshore: Not applicable 
addressing need for 
nav-aids or radar 
coverage. 
Tide range Offshore 
If connections to jetty need to 
accommodate a very high tidal range 
(approximately 5-6m) and this could be a 
safety issue. 
Onshore: Not applicable 
Marine hazard assessment 
and Jetty design review 
Manoeuvring  Offshore 
 Running aground could be an issue 
when tidal range could generate high 
local currents. 
 Dredging  / blasting of 
maneuvering area 
 Restrict berthing to 
slack tide only and 





 Firefighting access from tugs or from 
the jetty could be difficult if the 
vessel is high sided vessel. Difficult 
to throw foam high in the air. 
 Dedicated tugs designed 
specially to throw the 
water 
 Towers for firewater 
and foam delivery on 
the jetty side 
Hydrocarbon 
Hazards 
Offshore and Onshore 
 Any hydrocarbon release source like 
refrigerant storage or LNG loading 
or feed gas coming from onshore 
could pose flammable risk (Jet fires, 
BLEVEs from storage, flammable 
dispersion risk) 
 A design QRA to better 
understand the risk to 





Class requirements might apply in case 
of a FLNG barge 
 To evaluate class 
requirements early in 
the design phase 




Offshore and Onshore 
Earthquake/ Tsunami resulting 
equipment damage 
Seismic review of design 
for foreseeable earthquake 
and tsunami hazards 
 
 
Quantitative Risk Benchmarking  
Any quantitative risk assessment will aim to cover the major process safety/major loss of 
containment hazard issues. 
The main process safety / major hazard issues relate to:  
1. VCE-Vapor cloud explosions (due to ignition of flammable clouds in congested spaces).  
In congested places, hydrocarbon leaks can occur filling both the source unit and adjacent 
units, allowing a vapor cloud to be ignited in one unit with flame speeds accelerating to 
VCE levels and then propagating to adjacent congested units before the flame speed has 
substantially reduced.  Too close spacing effectively means the two units become one 
generating a higher overpressure, whereas greater spacing allows the overpressure to 
dissipate as it travels between the two units.  While the next congested unit can cause the 
flame speed and hence overpressure to build up again, its starting point is close to zero and 
the maximum overpressure is less than when the two volumes combine.  DNV GL 
participated in a TNO rule set reassessment in a project for BP and these generate less 
conservative results and have a clear rule set for when adjacent units combine (R. Pitblado, 
2014). Key rules applicable here include – congested volumes should be based on the unit 
footprint but with the height limited to 25ft (7.6m).  Two adjacent units will combine if 
their separation is less than 30ft (9.1m).  However adjacent process structures such as the 
central piperack can connect two separated units – if the piperack base is less than 25ft 
(7.6m) high.  A current Joint Industry Research Project coordinated by Gexcon and being 
carried out at DNV GL’s Spadeadam test site is assessing congested space separations 
(termed safety gaps) and to allow CFD models – such as FLACS – to model these better 
than at present.   
2. BLEVE- Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion.  If there are large pressure vessels 
containing liquid hydrocarbons at pressure (mainly the refrigerant liquids and heavies) and 
these can BLEVE if subjected to fire exposure – especially jet fires.  BLEVE’s have both 
overpressure and thermal impacts.  BLEVE fireball diameters can easily exceed 100m at 
ground level and then rise due to buoyancy.  These can impact the personnel spread across 
uniformly the facility. 
3. Jet fires- The Cold box exchangers, usually operate at high pressure, in the range of 35 
barg to 80 barg. Hence these units can generate liquid or vapor jet fires. The inlet natural 
gas source, the gas turbines, the gas treatment and the refrigeration trains also have a 
potential to generate vapor jet fires. Liquid jets are more serious (for a given pressure and 
hole size) as the mass discharge rate of liquids tends to be 10 times the mass rate of the 
same vapor.  Jet fires could be mitigated by the blast wall if this also has a jet rating. 
4. Pool fires- There could also be multiple sources of low pressure liquids –Boil-off gas units 
and spills from the loading/offloading system.  Pool fires of LNG tend to be hotter than 
other hydrocarbons and to generate a thinner but taller flame – based on the large scale 
Sandia trials 4-5 years ago.  Pool size can be limited by deck drainage arrangements and 
allowing spills to fall freely overboard into the sea – if environmental regulations permit 
this.  If regulations require spills to be retained in curbed areas and directed to an oily water 
tank – then the potential for longer lasting pool fires exists. 
 
5. Flammable vapors.  These can be generated in all areas, but natural gas is buoyant when 
close to ambient temperature to leaks from the gas turbines and regeneration units will 
tend to dissipate upwards, other cold natural gas or dense refrigerant leaks will be dense 
and spread through the units and either. 
 
6. Cryogenic Releases- A cryogenic release hazard from a vapor cloud, spray or spill could 
have the potential to cause fatality or cryogenic embrittlement impact to the asset. All 
release scenarios which have a final discharge temperature < -29 deg C are assumed to 
have a cryogenic hazard potential. This threshold temperature of -29 deg C could cause 
immediate liquid cryogenic burns and permanent damage to the lungs from inhaled vapor 
and also damage to carbon steel. Main impact potential scenarios and assumptions 
captured in this assessment are cold unignited vapor cloud  and fog causing impairment 
to humans resulting in fatalities or blocking escapeways and escalation potential across 
modules for cryogenic pools or sprays. 
 
Some of the key factors that need to be taken into account while estimating the quantitative risk 
for a LNG facility are as follows. 
 The number of process equipment affects the leak frequency. Liquefaction using mixed 
refrigerants will lead to higher hydrocarbon leak frequency than non-hydrocarbon 
refrigerants (e.g. nitrogen). However, use of nitrogen will have an impact in terms of 
asphyxiation that needs to be quantified. 
 In terms of release frequency, there could be some uncertainty associated with the use of 
offshore frequency data (e.g. UK HSE’s HCRD) for LNG equipment, however there is 
very little LNG-specific leak frequency data. 
 Higher the operating pressure, the consequence zones will be higher and hence the 
immediate, escape & evacuation fatality fraction will be higher and this could lead to 
high risk values. 
Individual Risk 
 The exposure time of personnel will have an influence on Individual Risk, e.g. Control 
center staff spending no time in the process areas will have a much lower than 
Maintenance crews 
 Other secondary factors will be effectiveness of gas detection, ignition sources, 
emergency shutdown, blowdown delay time that could affect end event fire frequencies. 
These will have a key role in terms of asset risk and impact on escape routes and living 
quarters. They will a more limited influence on individual risk as it is usually driven by 
immediate fatalities. 
 For non-process risks, ship collision depends on the location of the facility and no. of 
offloading operations, other supply vessel visits. 
 Transportation risk depends on flying time only assuming standard offshore shift pattern  
 Occupational Risk depends on the FAR values for different personnel a category which 




 All of the points mentioned above for individual risks apply for societal risk. In addition 
the PLL depends on the manning distribution across the different hazardous process 
areas. 
 For transportation, occupational and ship collision risk, more manning, more trips needed 
by helicopter, hence higher group risk. 
 
Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency (TRIF) 
 In addition to the frequency and consequence comments that were mentioned in the 
individual risk above section, the location of the Temporary Refuge (TR) plays a key 
role. The location of the TR with respect to the process areas and the prevailing wind 
direction is key for addressing smoke hazards. 
 The TR fire or blast rating is also a factor for determining its impairment. 
Escape route Impairment Frequency 
 Another issue is the availability of escape routes, due to the relatively narrow width 
compared to the length of FLNGs explosion and fire events have the potential to impair 
both escape routes at the same time, and hence escape route redundancy via the cargo 
deck can be usually be useful. 
Risk Criteria 
 Risk assessment is the process of comparing the level of risk against a set of criteria as 
well as identifying major risk contributors.  In the risk assessment stage, the quantified 
risk results are compared to pre-established risk criteria (from governmental regulatory 
requirements, recommended guidelines, or corporate guidelines) to indicate whether the 
risks are tolerable or to make some other judgment about their significance. 
 The critical point to note is the risk criteria picked must be closely aligned with the risk 
criteria to allow a meaningful assessment. Using very low failure frequency data and 
comparing it with lenient risk criteria could result in incorrect judgement of the high risk 
contributors. 
Individual Risk Benchmarking Example 
DNV GL has conducted several LNG QRA’s around the world. A simple benchmarking exercise 
has been conducted using this data to provide a better understanding and comparison of onshore 
LNG risk results. There are several parameters that affect the nature of the risk results:  
 The number of process equipment (including number of LNG trains) directly affects the leak 
frequency.  
 Variation in operating pressures can result in widely different risk results. Greater operating 
pressures are correlated to greater release frequencies and result in larger consequence zones. 
 The geographic location of the plant could also affect the dispersion risk results. 
 The end point criteria assumptions like flash fire fatality criteria (LFL or 0.5 LFL) could make 
a difference to the risk results. 
 
The individual risk (IR) results from eight onshore LNG facilities around the world are presented 
in the table below. For the different studies, the average radius of the LSIR contours (10-2 to 10-




Results Plant A Plant B Plant C Plant D Plant E Plant F Plant G Plant H 
LNG train area (meters) 
Radius - 
10-2 pa    236    100 
Radius - 
10-3  pa      113   
Radius - 
10-4 pa   180 317 130 176 35 422 
Radius - 
10-5 pa 79  355 507 228 388 279 556 
Radius - 
10-6 pa   405 573     
Radius - 
10-7 pa 158  545 669 319 664 528 1200 
Loading area (meters) 
Radius - 
10-3  pa      57   
Radius - 
10-4 pa  41  201  266 147 56 
Conclusion 
 
Risk Management is a Continuous process and the above presented benchmarking discussions 
can be used as a good starting point. As part of ongoing risk management ALARP (As Low as 
Reasonably Practicable) is a principle that can form the basis of a risk management system. It is 
philosophy for how one should treat risk and gives a goal to the risk management process. The 
CCPS defines ALARP as follows: The concept that efforts to reduce risk should be continued 
until the incremental sacrifice (in terms of time, effort, cost, or other expenditure of resources) is 
grossly disproportionate to the value of incremental risk reduction achieved.  
 
 
An ALARP process is a systematic risk treatment process where potential risk reducing 
measures are collected, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively and finally rejected or accepted. 
There is no single correct way in which to demonstrate risks are ALARP. However it is expected 
that for each major accident hazard identified for the facility, the demonstration will contain 
steps of the following process. 
1. Identification and consideration of a range of potential measures for further risk reduction, 
2. An ALARP register is established for the projects to keep track of identification, evaluations 
and decisions made related to a proposed risk reducing measure, 
3. Systematic analysis of each of the identified measures and a view formed on the safety 
benefit associated with each of them, 
4. Evaluation of the reasonable practicability of the identified measures, 
5. The implementation (could be planned implementation) of the identified reasonable 
practicability measures, 
6. Rejecting a risk reduction measure should be justified and well documented. 
Negligible Risk
Intolerable Region
As Low as Reasonably 
Practicable (ALARP) Region
Risk is undertaken only if a 
benefit is desired
Broadly Acceptable Region
No need for detailed working to
demonstrate ALARP
Risk cannot be justified on 
any grounds
Tolerable only if risk reduction is 
impracticable or  if its cost is 
grossly disproportionate to the 
improvement gained
Necessary to maintain assurance
that risk remains at this level
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